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having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia and Kosovo, in particular those of 10 May 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Serbia (1) and of 10 May 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Kosovo (2),

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having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia and Kosovo, in particular to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

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having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

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having regard to Kosovo’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 December 2022,

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having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999,

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having regard to the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations between the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo (Brussels Agreement) of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

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having regard to the agreement on free movement between the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, and to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, as well as to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

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having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia of 18 March 2023 and to the Implementation Annex thereto,

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having regard to the European Parliament’s co-facilitated parliamentary dialogue process in Serbia,

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having regard to the EU Statement of 28 September 2023 on the recent developments in the north of Kosovo made at Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council No. 1444,

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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas, over the past year in northern Kosovo, there have been a number of incidents including road blockades, election boycotts, attacks on municipal buildings and violent assaults on police officers and NATO soldiers by Kosovo Serbs and Serbs; whereas since July 2022, extremist organised groups with links to members of the Serbian Government have stoked tensions in the north of Kosovo by building barricades and engaging in violence against the Kosovan authorities as a reaction to the decision regarding car licence plates; whereas in November 2022, Kosovo Serbs withdrew from Kosovan institutions in the north of the country;

B.

whereas the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo was concluded on 19 April 2013, followed by other agreements, most recently the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of 18 March 2023, which, however, Serbian President Vučić refused to sign; whereas the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations has been ongoing since 2011; whereas only three elements have been addressed from the latest Implementation Annex: the Declaration of Missing Persons, the presentation of the Management Team statute for the Association/Community and the announcement of the Joint Monitoring Committee;

C.

whereas on 23 April 2023, Kosovo held local by-elections in four municipalities with a Serb majority in the north of the country; whereas the main ethnic Serb party Srpska Lista, which has close links with President Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), actively boycotted the elections; whereas as a result of this boycott, the turnout in the elections was only around 3 %; whereas the elections were held in line with Kosovo’s legal framework, but cannot be considered to have yielded a representative outcome;

D.

whereas on 26 May 2023, the Kosovo Special Police escorted the newly elected mayors so that they could enter the municipality buildings; whereas on 26 May 2023, there were violent clashes between protesters and the Kosovan police in the north of Kosovo; whereas between 29 and 31 May 2023, violent agitators brutally attacked NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) officers, Kosovan police officers and journalists; whereas following these events, KFOR increased its presence on the ground;

E.

whereas on 1 June 2023, Commission Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell asked Kosovo to withdraw special police forces from urban neighbourhoods in the north of the country, to hold new local elections while ensuring the participation of Kosovo Serbs, and to start work on bringing the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) into the EU-facilitated dialogue; whereas VP/HR Borrell warned that failure to do so would have serious consequences for the EU’s relations with Kosovo;

F.

whereas on 14 June 2023, Serbian special forces violently abducted three Kosovan border police officers in the border region between the north of Kosovo and Serbia; whereas officials from Kosovo and Serbia gave different locations for the abduction, each accusing the other of crossing the border illegally; whereas the officers were later released by Serbia;

G.

whereas since 1 July 2023, the Commission has imposed negative measures against Kosovo; whereas the EU has not imposed similar measures against Serbia;

H.

whereas following the high-level meeting of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue held on 14 September 2023, the EU expressed its concern over the parties’ lack of implementation of their commitments under the Ohrid Agreement and its Implementation Annex;

I.

whereas on 24 September 2023, a group of heavily armed ethnic Serb paramilitaries carried out a terrorist attack in the north of Kosovo, in which one Kosovan police officer and three attackers lost their lives; whereas the terrorists barricaded themselves inside Banjska Monastery despite the presence of a group of pilgrims from Serbia, who were also inside; whereas when the Kosovan police gained control of the situation, arrested some of the gunmen and confiscated a massive amount of weapons, explosives and ammunition;

J.

whereas inter-ethnic attacks in Kosovo are frequent, such as the attack perpetrated against two young Kosovo Serbs on Orthodox Christmas Eve 2023;

K.

whereas among the Serbs who died during the incident of 24 September 2023, Bojan Mijailović was identified by Kosovo authorities to have links to the Serbian intelligence chief Aleksandar Vulin; whereas Serbia observed an official day of mourning as the country cancelled sports events and lowered flags to half mast, with Serbian Defence Minister Miloš Vučević describing the Serb gunmen killed in Kosovo as ‘martyrs’;

L.

whereas the Kosovan Government accused Serbia of organising the attack, later claiming that the goal was to annex the Serb-populated north of Kosovo; whereas they presented evidence showing the group’s connection to Serbia;

M.

whereas Milan Radoičić, Vice-President of the Srpska Lista, claimed responsibility for organising the attack, denying that the Serbian Government was involved; whereas he was detained, but released from custody in Serbia and is yet to be prosecuted; whereas in 2021, Radoičić was added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury, which targets persons responsible for corruption and serious human rights violations; whereas in 2022, Radoičić was also sanctioned under the UK Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations;

N.

whereas the Serbian authorities have denied any involvement in the attack;

O.

whereas the Serbian police, special police and army units had been moved into 48 forward positions close to the Serbian border with Kosovo in the weeks and months before the 24 September 2023 attack, further escalating what was an already tense situation; whereas on 29 September 2023 the EU, the US Administration and the German Government urged Serbia to withdraw its troops from the border with Kosovo; whereas Serbia later withdrew part of its forces; whereas these incidents have exacerbated regional instability and undermined the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue;

P.

whereas the Srpska Lista publicly announced on 13 October 2023 that it would unconditionally take part in the local elections in the north of Kosovo;

Q.

whereas the Kosovo police is the first security responder in the country, with the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo’s (EULEX) Formed Police Unit as the second and KFOR as the third;

R.

whereas, despite the facilitation efforts of the EU over the past few months, Serbia and Kosovo have failed to make progress towards the normalisation of their relations;

S.

whereas Serbia’s continued close relationship and partnership with Russia and China raises questions about Serbia’s strategic direction and hinders the country’s economic and political development; whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere with and threaten neighbouring sovereign states, including Kosovo; whereas Serbia has become a safe haven for Russian companies; whereas social media platforms have become tools for fostering anti-democratic political movements in the Western Balkans;